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Abstract. We construct the Google matrices of bitcoin transactions for
all year quarters during the period of January 11, 2009 till April 10,
2013. During the last quarters the network size contains about 6 million
users (nodes) with about 150 million transactions. From PageRank and
CheiRank probabilities, analogous to trade import and export, we deter-
mine the dimensionless trade balance of each user and model the con-
tagion propagation on the network assuming that a user goes bankrupt
if its balance exceeds a certain dimensionless threshold κ. We find that
the phase transition takes place for κ < κc ≈ 0.1 with almost all users
going bankrupt. For κ > 0.55 almost all users remain safe. We find that
even on a distance from the critical threshold κc the top PageRank and
CheiRank users, as a house of cards, rapidly drop to the bankruptcy. We
attribute this effect to strong interconnections between these top users
which we determine with the reduced Google matrix algorithm. This
algorithm allows to establish efficiently the direct and indirect interac-
tions between top PageRank users. We argue that this study models the
contagion on real financial networks.
Keywords: Markov chains · Google matrix · Financial networks.
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 produced an enormous impact on financial, so-
cial and political levels for many world countries (see e.g. [1,2]). After this crisis
the importance of contagion in financial networks gained a practical importance
and generated serious academic research with various models proposed for the
description of this phenomenon (see e.g. Reviews [3,4]). The interbank conta-
gion is of especial interest due to possible vulnerability of banks during periods
of crisis (see e.g. [5,6]). The bank networks have relatively small size with about
N ≈ 6000 bank units (nodes) for the whole US Federal Reserve [7] and about
N ≈ 2000 for bank units of Germany [8]. However, the access to these bank net-
works is highly protected that makes essentially forbidden any academic research
of real bank networks.
However, at present the transactions in cryptocurrency are open to public
and the analysis of the related networks are accessible for academic research.
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The first cryptocurrency is bitcoin launched in 2008 [9]. The first steps in the
network analysis of bitcoin transactions are reported in [10,11] and overview of
bitcoin system development is given in [12]. The Google matrix analysis of the
bitcoin network (BCN) has been pushed forward in [13] demonstrating that the
main part of wealth of the network is captured by a small fraction of users. The
Google matrix G describes the Markov transitions on directed networks and is at
the foundations of Google search engine [14,15]. It finds also useful applications
for variety of directed networks describe in [16]. The ranking of network nodes
is based on the PageRank and CheiRank probabilities of G matrix which are on
average proportional to the number of ingoing and outgoing links being similar to
import and export in the world trade network [17,18]. We use these probabilities
to determine the balance of each user (node) of bitcoin network and model
the contagion of users using the real data of bitcoin transactions from January
11, 2009 till April 10, 2013. We also analyze the direct and hidden (indirect)
links between top PageRank users of BCN using the recently developed reduced
Google matrix (REGOMAX) algorithm [19,20,21,22].
Table 1. List of Bitcoin transfer networks. The BCyyQq Bitcoin network corresponds
to transactions between active users during the qth quarter of year 20yy. N is the
number of users andNl is the total amount of transactions in the corresponding quarter.
Network N Nl Network N Nl Network N Nl
BC10Q3 37818 57437 BC11Q3 1546877 2857232 BC12Q3 3742174 8381654
BC10Q4 70987 111015 BC11Q4 1884918 3635927 BC12Q4 4671604 11258315
BC11Q1 204398 333268 BC12Q1 2186107 4395611 BC13Q1 5997717 15205087
BC11Q2 696948 1328505 BC12Q2 2645039 5655802 BC13Q2 6297009 16056427
2 Datasets, algorithms and methods
We use the bitcoin transaction data described in [13]. However, there the network
was constructed from the transactions performed from the very beginning till
a given moment of time (bounded by April 2013). Instead, here we construct
the network only for time slices formed by quarters of calendar year. Thus we
obtain 12 networks with N users and Nl directed links for each quarter given in
Table 1. We present our main results for BC13Q1.
The Google matrix G of BCN is constructed in the standard way as it is
described in detail in [13]. Thus all bitcoin transactions from a given user (node)
to other users are normalized to unity, the columns of dangling nodes with
zero transactions are replaced by a column with all elements being 1/N . This
forms S matrix of Markov transitions which is multiplied by the damping factor
α = 0.85 so that finally G = αS + (1 − α)E/N where the matrix E has all
elements being unity. We also construct the matrix G∗ for the inverted direction
of transactions and then following the above procedure for G. The PageRank
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vector P is the right eigenvector of G, GP = λP , with the largest eigenvalue
λ = 1 (
∑
j P (j) = 1). Each component Pu with u ∈ {u1, u2, . . . , uN} is positive
and gives the probability to find a random surfer at the given node u (user u).
In a similar way the CheiRank vector P ∗ is defined as the right eigenvector of
G∗ with eigenvalue λ∗ = 1, i.e., G∗P ∗ = P ∗. Each component P ∗u of P
∗ gives
the CheiRank probability to find a random surfer on the given node u (user
u) of the network with inverted direction of links (see [16,23]). We order all
users {u1, u2, . . . , uN} by decreasing PageRank probability Pu. We define the
PageRank index K such as we assign K = 1 to user u with the maximal Pu,
then we assign K = 2 to the user with the second most important PageRank
probability, and so on ..., we assign K = N to the user with the lowest PageRank
probability. Similarly we define the CheiRank indexes K∗ = 1, 2, . . . , N using
CheiRank probabilities {P ∗u1 , P ∗u2 , . . . , P ∗uN }. K∗ = 1 (K∗ = N) is assigned to
user with the maximal (minimal) CheiRank probability.
The reduced Google matrix GR is constructed for a selected subset of Nr
nodes. The construction is based on methods of scattering theory used in dif-
ferent fields including mesoscopic and nuclear physics, and quantum chaos. It
describes, in a matrix of size Nr×Nr, the full contribution of direct and indirect
pathways, happening in the global network of N nodes, between Nr selected
nodes of interest. The PageRank probabilities of the Nr nodes are the same as
for the global network with N nodes, up to a constant factor taking into account
that the sum of PageRank probabilities over Nr nodes is unity. The (i, j)-element
of GR can be viewed as the probability for a random seller (surfer) starting at
node j to arrive in node i using direct and indirect interactions. Indirect interac-
tions describes pathways composed in part of nodes different from the Nr ones of
interest. The computation steps of GR offer a decomposition into matrices that
clearly distinguish direct from indirect interactions, GR = Grr +Gpr +Gqr [20].
Here Grr is generated by the direct links between selected Nr nodes in the global
G matrix with N nodes. The matrix Gpr is usually rather close to the matrix in
which each column is given by the PageRank vector Pr. Due to that Gpr does not
bring much information about direct and indirect links between selected nodes.
The interesting role is played by Gqr. It takes into account all indirect links
between selected nodes appearing due to multiple pathways via the N global
network nodes (see [19,20]). The matrix Gqr = Gqrd +Gqrnd has diagonal (Gqrd)
and non-diagonal (Gqrnd) parts where Gqrnd describes indirect interactions be-
tween nodes. The explicit mathematical formulas and numerical computation
methods of all three matrix components of GR are given in [19,20,21,22].
Following [18,21,22], we remind that the PageRank (CheiRank) probability
of a user u is related to its ability to buy (sell) bitcoins, we therefore determine
the balance of a given user as Bu = (P
∗(u)−P (u))/(P ∗(u)+P (u)). We consider
that a user u goes to bankruptcy if Bu ≤ −κ. If it is the case the user u ingoing
flow of bitcoins is stopped. This is analogous to the world trade case when
countries with unbalanced trade stop their import in case of crisis [17,18]. Here
κ has the meaning of bankruptcy or crisis threshold. Thus the contagion model
is defined as follows: at iteration τ , the PageRank and CheiRank probabilities
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Fig. 1. Twenty most present users in top100s of BCyyQq networks (see Tab. 1) com-
puted with PageRank (left panel) and CheiRank (right panel) algorithms. In horizontal
axis the twenty users labeled from 1 to 20 are ranked according to the number of oc-
currences in the time slice top100s. The color ranges from red (user is ranked at the
1st position, K = 1 or K∗ = 1) to blue (user is ranked at the 100th position, K = 100
or K∗ = 100). Black color indicates a user absent from the top100 of the corresponding
time slice.
are computed taking into account that all ingoing bitcoin transactions to users
went to bankruptcy at previous iterations are stopped (i.e., these transactions
are set to zero). Using these new PageRank and CheiRank probabilities we
compute again the balance of each user, determining which additional users went
to bankruptcy at iteration τ . Initially at the first iteration, τ = 1, PageRank and
CheiRank probabilities and thus user balances are computed using the Google
matrices G and G∗ constructed from the global network of bitcoin transactions (a
priori no bankrupted users). A user who went bankrupt remains in bankruptcy
at all future iterations. In this way we obtain the fraction, Wc(τ) = Nu(τ)/N ,
of users in bankruptcy or in crisis at different iteration times τ .
3 Results
The PageRank and CheiRank algorithms have been applied to the bitcoin net-
works BCyyQq presented in Tab. 1. An illustration showing the rank of the
twenty most present users in the top 100s of these bitcoin networks is given in
Fig. 1. We observe that the most present user (#1 in Fig. 1) was, from the third
quarter of 2011 to the fourth quarter of 2012, at the very top positions of both
the PageRank ranking and of the CheiRank ranking. Consequently, this user was
very central in the corresponding bitcoin networks with a very influential activ-
ity of bitcoin seller and buyer. Excepting the case of the most present user (#1
in Fig. 1), the other users are (depending of the year quarter considered) either
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top sellers (well ranked according to CheiRank algorithm, K∗ ∼ 1− 100) or top
buyers of bitcoins (well ranked according to PageRank algorithm, K ∼ 1−100).
In other words excepting the first column associated to user #1 there is almost
no overlap between left and right panels of Fig. 1.
From now on we concentrate our study on the BC13Q1 network. For this
bitcoin network, the density of users on the PageRank-CheiRank plane (K,K∗)
is shown in Fig. 2a. At low K,K∗, users are centered near the diagonal K = K∗
that corresponds to the fact that on average users try to keep balance between
ingoing and outgoing bitcoin flows. Similar effect has been seen also for world
trade networks [17].
The dependence of the fraction of bankrupt users Wc = Nu/N on the
bankruptcy threshold κ is shown in Fig. 2b at different iterations τ . At low
κ < κc ≈ 0.1 almost 100% of users went bankrupt at large τ = 10.
1
101
102
103
104
105
106
101 102 103 104 105 106
K*
K
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
N
u/
N
κb
τ=5τ=1 τ=3
τ=10
a
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
Fig. 2. Panel a: density of users, dN(K,K∗)/dKdK∗, in PageRank–CheiRank plane
(K,K∗) for BC13Q1 network; density is computed with 200× 200 cells equidistant in
logarithmic scale; the colors are associated to the decimal logarithm of the density;
the color palette is a linear gradient from green color (low user densities) to red color
(high user densities). Black color indicates absence of users. Panel b: fraction Nu/N of
BC13Q1 users in bankruptcy shown as a function of κ for τ = 1, 3, 5, and 10.
Indeed, Fig. 3 shows that the transition to bankruptcy is similar to a phase
transition so that at large τ we have Wc = Nu/N ≈ 1 for κ < κc ≈ 0.1, in the
range κc ≈ 0.1 < κ < 0.55 there are only about 50%–70% of users in bankrupcy
while for κ > 0.55 almost all users remain safe at large times.
The distribution of bankrupt and safe users on PageRank–CheiRank plane
(K,K∗) is shown in Fig. 4 at different iteration times τ . For crisis thresholds
κ = 0.15 and κ = 0.3, we see that very quickly users at top K,K∗ ∼ 1 indexes
go bankrupt and with growth of τ more and more users go bankrupt even if they
are located below the diagonal K = K∗ thus having initially positive balance
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Fig. 3. Fraction Nu/N of BC13Q1 users in bankruptcy as a function of κ and τ .
Bu. However, the links with other users lead to propagation of contagion so that
even below the diagonal many users turn to bankruptcy. This features are similar
for κ = 0.15 and κ = 0.3 but of course the number of safe users is larger for
κ = 0.3. For a crisis threshold κ = 0.6, the picture is stable at every iterations τ ,
the contagion is very moderate and concerns only the white region comprising
roughly the same number of safe and bankrupt users. This white region broadens
moderately as τ increases. We note that even some of the users above K = K∗
remain safe. We observe also that for κ = 0.6 about a third of top K,K∗ ∼ 1
users remain safe.
Fig. 5 presents the integrated fraction, Wc(K) = Nu(K)/N , of users which
have a PageRank index below or equal to K and which went bankrupt at τ ≤
10. We define in a similar manner the integrated fraction of CheiRank users
Wc(K
∗) = Nu(K∗)/N being bankrupts. From Fig. 5 we observe W (K) ≈ K/N
and W (K∗) ≈ K∗/N . Formal fits Wc(K) = µ−1Kβ of the data in the range
10 < K < 105 give (µ = 5.94557 × 106 ± 95, β = 0.998227 ± 1 × 10−6) for
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Fig. 4. BC13Q1 users in bankruptcy (red) and safe (blue) for κ = 0.15 (top row), for
κ = 0.3 (middle row), and for κ = 0.6 (bottom row). For each panel the horizontal
(vertical) axis corresponds to PageRank (CheiRank) indexes K (K∗). In logarithmic
scale, the (K,K∗) plane has been divided in 200× 200 cells. Defining Ncell as the total
number of users in a given cell and Nu,cell as the number of users who went bankrupt
in the cell until iteration τ , we compute, for each cell, the value (2Nu,cell−Ncell)/Ncell
giving +1 if every user in the cell went bankrupt (dark red), 0 if the number of users
went bankrupt is equal to the number of safe users, and −1 if no user went bankrupt
(dark blue). Black colored cells indicate cell without any user.
κ = 0.15 and (µ = 5.65515 × 106 ± 231, β = 0.99002 ± 4 × 10−6) for κ = 0.3.
Formal fits Wc(K
∗) = µ−1K∗β of the data in the range 10 < K∗ < 105 give
(µ = 1.03165 × 107 ± 3956, β = 1.02511 ± 3 × 10−5) for κ = 0.15 and (µ =
1.67775× 107 ± 1.139× 104, β = 1.05084± 6× 10−5) for κ = 0.3.
The results of contagion modeling show that PageRank and CheiRank top
users K,K∗ ∼ 1 enter in contagion phase very rapidly. We suppose that this hap-
pens due to strong interlinks existing between these users. Thus it is interesting
to see what are the effective links and interactions between these top PageRank
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Fig. 5. Integrated fractions, Wc(K) and Wc(K
∗), of BC13Q1 users which went
bankrupt at τ ≤ 10 for κ = 0.15 (solid lines) and for κ = 0.3 (dashed lines) as a
function of PageRank index K (black lines) and CheiRank index K∗ (red lines). The
inset shows Wc(K)N/K as a function of K and Wc(K
∗)N/K∗ as a function of K∗.
and top CheiRank users. With this aim we construct the reduced Google matrix
GR for the top 20 PageRank users of BC13Q1 network. This matrix GR and
its three components Gpr, Grr and Gqrnd are shown in Fig. 6. We characterize
each matrix component by its weight defined as the sum of all matrix elements
divided by Nr = 20. By definition the weight of GR is WR = 1. The weights
of all components are given in the caption of Fig. 6. We see that Wpr has the
weight of about 50% while Wrr and Wqr have the weight of about 25%. These
values are significantly higher comparing to the cases of Wikipedia networks (see
e.g. [20]). The Grr matrix component (Fig. 6 bottom left panel) is similar to the
bitcoin mass transfer matrix [13] and the (i, j)-element of Grr is related to direct
bitcoin transfer from user j to user i. As Wrr = 0.29339, the PageRank top20
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Fig. 6. Reduced Google matrix GR associated to the top 20 PageRank users of BC13Q1
network. The reduced Google matrixGR (top left) has a weightWR = 1, its components
Grr (bottom left), Gpr (top right), and Gqrnd (bottom right) have weights Wrr =
0.29339, Wpr = 0.48193, and Wqr = 0.22468 (Wqrnd = 0.11095). Matrix entries are
ordered according to BC13Q1 top 20 PageRank index.
users directly transfer among them on average about 30% of the total of bitcoins
exchanged by these 20 users. In particular, about 70% of the bitcoin transfers
from users K = 5 and K = 14 are directed toward user K = 2. Also user
K = 5 buy about 30% of the bitcoins sold by user K = 2. We observe a closed
loop between users K = 2 and K = 5 which highlights between them an active
bitcoin trade during the period 2013 Q1. Also 30% of bitcoins transferred from
user K = 19 were bought buy user K = 1. The 20× 20 reduced Google matrix
GR (Fig. 6 top left panel) gives a synthetic picture of bitcoin direct and indirect
transactions taking into account direct transactions between the N ∼ 106 users
encoded in the global N ×N Google matrix G. We clearly see that many bitcoin
transfers converge toward user K = 1 since this user is the most central in the
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bitcoin network. Although the Grr matrix component indicates that user K = 1
obtains about 10% to 30% of the bitcoins transferred from its direct partners,
the Gpr matrix component indicates that indirectly the effective amount trans-
ferred from direct and indirect partners are greater about 10% to more than
45%. In particular, although no direct transfer exists from users K = 11 and
K = 16 to user K = 1, about 45% of the bitcoins transferred in the network
from users K = 11 and K = 16 converge indirectly to user K = 1. Looking
at the diagonal of the GR matrix we observe that about 60% of the transferred
bitcoins from user K = 1 returns effectively to user K = 1, the same happen,
e.g, with user K = 2 and user K = 15 with about 30% of transferred bitcoins
going back. The Gqr matrix component (Fig. 6 bottom right panel) gives the in-
teresting picture of hidden bitcoin transactions, i.e., transactions which are not
encoded in the Grr matrix component since they are not direct transactions, and
which are not captured by the Gpr matrix component as they do not necessarily
involve transaction paths with the most central users. Here we clearly observe
that 25% of the total transferred bitcoins from user K = 15 converge indirectly
toward user K = 2. We note that this indirect transfer is the result of many
indirect transaction pathways involving many users other than the PageRank
top20 users. We observe also a closed loop of hidden transactions between users
K = 17 and K = 18.
4 Discussion
We performed the Google matrix analysis of Bitcoin networks for transactions
from the very start of bitcoins till April 10, 2013. The transactions are divided
by year quarters and the Google matrix is constructed for each quarter. We
present the results for the first quarter of 2013 being typical for other quarters
of 2011, 2012. We determine the PageRank and CheiRank vectors of the Google
matrices of direct and inverted bitcoin flows. These probabilities characterize
import (PageRank) and export (CheiRank) exchange flows for each user (node)
of the network. In this way we obtain the dimensionless balance of each user Bu
(−1 < Bu < 1) and model the contagion propagation on the network assuming
that a user goes bankrupt if its dimensional balance exceeds a certain bankruptcy
threshold κ (Bu ≤ −κ). We find that the phase transition takes place in a vicinity
of the critical threshold κ = κc ≈ 0.1 below which almost 100% of users become
bankrupts. For κ > 0.55 almost all users remain safe and for 0.1 < κ < 0.55 about
60% of users go bankrupt. It is interesting that, as house of cards, the almost all
top PageRank and Cheirank users rapidly drop to bankruptcy even for κ = 0.3
being not very close to the critical threshold κc ≈ 0.1. We attribute this effect
to strong interconnectivity between top users that makes them very vulnerable.
Using the reduced Google matrix algorithm we determine the effective direct
and indirect interactions between the top 20 PageRank users that shows their
preferable interlinks including the long pathways via the global network of almost
6 million size.
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We argue that the obtained results model the real situation of contagion
propagation of the financial and interbank networks.
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